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Abstract 
Over the last decade, Nuclear energy has become one of important energy. Nuclear power systems become more complex and 
traditional safety methods are hard to be applied. This paper presents a novel approach for nuclear power plant safety analysis
which called Bayesian Networks(BN). The BN model is constructed based on the combination of Failure Mode, Effect Analysis 
(FMEA) and Fault Trees Analysis(FTA). The probability of the model’s root nodes is estimated by Bayesian estimation method 
and Monte Carlo simulation. Bidirectional inference and sensitivity analysis of the model is also researched. At last, we use a
case study to show the method’s advantages compared with traditional methods in nuclear power plant safety analysis. 
© 2010 Published by Elsevier Ltd. 
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1. Introduction 
The development and peaceful use of nuclear energy was one of the most outstanding achievements in the history 
of the 20th century. Nuclear energy had been considered a economical, safe, reliable, clean energy. Faced with 
economic, security, nonproliferation, and environmental challenges, many countries had cost plenty manpower and 
material resources to develop nuclear safety research. Although personal injury in nuclear power plant accident was 
the lowest in the industry, but the influence of the accident was enormous. Such as Three Mile Island nuclear 
accident, Chernobyl nuclear accident and so on. So it was important to analyze the nuclear power safety. 
The main characteristics in nuclear power safety analysis were: 
(1) Complicated structure. Nuclear power equipments not only had complicated structure, plenty of units, but 
also practiced as polymorphism, uncertainty, failure dependency[1],. With few numbers and lacking information in 
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complex nuclear power systems, the traditional safety analysis methods were difficult to accurately assess their 
safety.
(2) Strict safety management. Nuclear power plant must be operated by strict safety management. So its safety 
analysis should include safety management, and provide foundation for safety decision-making. 
(3) Human factors. Human factors were an important side in nuclear safety. So the new safety method should 
expediently deal with human factors. 
FMEA and FTA were both the most important methods in system safety analysis. FMEA dealt with single point 
failure, was built bottom to up, and presented as tables. FTA analyzed combinations of failures, was built top to 
down, and presented as diagrams. Both FMEA and FTA had advantages and disadvantages. FMEA has been heavily 
dependent on personal experience and information, and can not deal with the combination of various failure and 
human factors. FTA may miss some failure modes. Large fault trees were not easy to understand and their 
mathematics were often non-unitary solution. For complex nuclear power systems safety analysis, FMEA and FTA 
had obvious shortcomings. 
It was a useful way to integrate FMEA and FTA for safety analysis of complex nuclear power systems. Its 
combination not only combined their advantages of these two methods, but also addressed both deficiencies. Many 
people had studied the combination of FMEA and FTA (FMEA/FTA). Zigmund Bluvband[2]introduced Bouncing 
Failure Analysis(BFA), which connected the two methodologies allowing an analyst from FTA to FMEA and back, 
changing the presentation and the direction of the analysis for convenience of analysis at any point in the process. 
Robyn R. Lutz [3,4]proposed a bi-directional analysis to integrated extension of software FMEA(SFMEA) and 
software FTA(SFTA), and used the bi-directional analysis to solve the safety analysis of software with high 
reliability. 
Although the FEMA/FTA addressed part of the shortcomings of FMEA and FTA, but it was still inadequate for 
complex nuclear power system, and can not solve the polymorphism, failure dependency and uncertainties. 
Bayesian Networks, which rapidly developed in recent years, was a powerful tool to process polymorphism, 
dependency and uncertainty for nuclear power system. Bayesian Networks (BN) was one of the important analysis 
techniques in information theory, system engineering and other fields. Bobbio and Portinale introduced BN to 
reliability analysis by mapping fault tree into BN[5]. Burton Lee carried out a detailed study in BN modeling and 
analysis based on FMEA in system design phase[6,7]. This paper proposed the BN method based on FMEA/FTA, and 
used Bayesian estimate, Monte Carlo simulation to assess the probability of root nodes. This method not only 
addressed FMEA/FTA own shortcomings, but also solved the difficulties in safety analysis of complex nuclear 
power system. This method combined the FMEA and FTA information, which consistent with Bayesian information 
theory and made the model more accurate. 
2. Combination of FMEA and FTA(FMEA/FTA) 
FMEA was a method to analyze the product’s all possible failure models and possible impact of each failure 
mode, and classify the severity of impact and probability of each failure model[8].FMEA had been proposed since 
the 50 years of the 20th century, and widely used in aerospace industry, micro-electronics industry, automobile 
industry, ship industry et al. It formed a series of standards and norms, such as MIL-STD-1629A. 
FTA was first proposed by Bell Labs in 1961, and used for safety analysis in aerospace industry, petrochemical, 
machinery manufacturing, and other areas[9]. This paper didn’t give detailed introduction about FMEA and FTA 
because both of them were widely used and had mature technical specifications. 
The FMEA/FTA was simply introduced by following steps: 
(1) System functional analysis. Making clear the content and scope of safety analysis. Determining the level of 
FMEA and the basic function item. Establishing the system’s functional schematic diagram. 
(2) FMEA. Carrying out FMEA on each basic function item. If the component’s information was stored in 
database, its FMEA can be got from the database directly. Determining the next level impact, the severity of 
ultimate impact, and filling out the system’s FMEA worksheets. 
(3) Finding the critical components and the corresponding ultimate impact. The critical components were 
weakness of system and should get more attention. 
(4) FTA. Selecting the ultimate impact event as top event, and carry out its FTA. 
(5) Make conclusions by FMEA/FTA. 
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The FMEA/FTA method listed system failure modes to form the FT. It can effectively overcome the respective 
shortcomings of FMEA and FTA and solve the problems in safety analysis of nuclear power system. 
3. BN based on FMEA/FTA 
3.1. BN
BN was proposed by Pearl in 1986[10], which was first used in the field of artificial intelligence, and then had 
been rapid development in information technology, industrial, medical, economy, reliability, safety fields. One with 
N nodes BN consists of two parts: 
(1) Mode structure, namely the N-node directed acyclic graph G. The nodes set V={V1…,VN} represents 
variables that can be abstraction of any things, such as the equipment state, observations value, personnel operations, 
and so on. Directed edges between nodes represent the association relationship between variables, usually called 
causal relationship. For the directed edges (Vi,Vj), Vj is called the parent node of Vi, and Vi is called the child mode 
of Vj. The node without parent node is called root node, and node without child node is called leaf node. Parent node 
set is usually represented as Pa(Vi). 
(2) The relevant parameters, representing probability of root node and conditional probability between nodes. By 
the conditional independence assumption of BN, conditional probability distribution can be described as P(ViΊ
Pa(Vi)), which expresses the quantitative association between node and its parent nodes. The joint probability 
distribution of all nodes can be calculated when the priori probability of root nodes and conditional probability 
distribution is obtained. 
Using the conditional independence of BN, we can greatly simplify the calculation. The joint probability 
distribution of variables can be expressed as: 
N
1 N i i
i 1
p(V V ) p(V Pa(V ))
 
                                                                         (1) 
3.2. The model of BN based on FMEA/FTA 
The mode can be constructed by following steps: 
(1) FT to BN. Constructing BN by FT from FMEA/FTA. The method proposed by Bobbio in the literature[5]. 
(2) Model checking and improvement. The model needed to check whether it has same nodes and the logical and 
causal relationship between nodes. The node can be deleted when it is individual independent and do not impact on 
system safety. 
(3) Obtaining probability. Node’s probabilities include root probability and conditional probability. This paper 
used Bayes estimate and Monte Carlo simulation to assess the probability of root nodes. The conditional probability 
can be determined by the probability importance of failure modes or determined by the method mapped fault tree 
into BN. The conditional probability can also be based on expert experience in the early period of the model. 
(4) Model amendment. As the employ time increase and the accumulation of failure events of complex systems, 
the structure and parameters of the model needed to be amendment to make the model improved. 
3.3. Bidirectional inference  and sensitivity analysis  
(1) Diagnostic inference 
The marginal probability of Vi is: 
i
i
exceptV
p(V ) p(V) ¦                                                                           (2) 
According to Bayes theorem, when an event has occurred or evidence is found, the posteriori probability of other 
nodes can be calculated as follows: 
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V
P(V,e) P(V,e)
P(V e)
P(e) P(V,e)
  
¦
                                                          (3) 
And e was represented as a evidence. 
When the top event had happened, the probability of causal events can be calculated by BN model. Diagnostic 
inference can be used to judge main cause of the top event. When e was the top event, equation(3) was diagnostic 
inference. 
(2) Predictive inference 
Predictive inference was used to judge the influence in top event of causal events. When the causal events 
happened, the probability of the top event can be calculated by BN model through equation(3). 
(3) Sensitivity analysis 
According to BN’ bidirectional inference, the rate of change of top event caused by causal event can be 
calculated. It was called sensitivity analysis, and used to judge the weakness of nuclear power system. 
4. Bayes assessment and Monte Carlo simulation 
Estimating root nodes probability in BN model was an important content in BN learning. There were two major 
problems in root probability estimation. (1) Multi-distribution. Not all components’ probability distribution function 
was exponential distribution. Some components’ probability distribution function was other distribution, such as 
normal distribution. (2) Lacking data. Nuclear power safety analysis was a small sample problem. This paper used 
Bayesian estimation and Monte Carlo simulation to assess the root nodes probability. It was useful to solve the two 
major problems. 
4.1. Exponential  distribution 
When root nodes’ probability distribution function was exponential distribution, it was supposed that the sample 
data was ( 1, 2,..., ) ix i N ˈ ix ’s probability distribution function was: 
( ) i
x
if x e
O O ˈO  was represented as failure rate                          (4) 
According to the relationship of exponential distribution and * distribution[12], it can be gained: 
~ (1, )* Oix                                                                                   (5) 
So its summation was: 
1
( , )
 
 * O¦
N
i
i
x N                                                                               (6) 
Choosing O ’s conjugate distribution as: 
0 0 0( ) ( , )S O  * O D E                                                                           (7) 
And 0D , 0E was super parameter. 
According to Bayes equation, we can get: 
0 0
1 1
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Given the confidence degree as1 J , the Bayes upper limit of O should meet the next equation. 
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So the probability of root nodes at time x was as follow: 
( ) 1 exp( )uF x xO                                                                           (10) 
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4.2. Normal distribution 
When root nodes’ probability distribution function was normal distribution, it was supposed that the sample data 
was ( 1,2,..., )iy i N , and V was known. 
So
2~ ( , )iy N P V                                                                                 (11) 
AndP ’s conjugate distribution was: 
2
0 0 0( ) ( , )NS P P V ˈ 0P , 0V  was super parameter                               (12) 
So
2
1
1
( , / )
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i
i
Y y N n
n
P V
 
  ¦                                                             (13) 
Its likelihood function was the below equation.
2
2
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22
n n YL Y PP
VSV
­ ½ ® ¾
¯ ¿
                                                       (14) 
According to Bayes equation, we can get: 
1 1~ ( , )NP P V                                                                              (15) 
And 
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                                                      (16) 
So the probability of root nodes at time y was as follow: 
( ) 1
yF y P
V
§ · )¨ ¸© ¹
                                                                       (17) 
4.3. Monte Carlo simulation 
Data lacking was a problem in root nodes estimation in nuclear power BN model. This paper used Monte Carlo 
simulation based Bayesian estimation. Monte Carlo simulation was suit for the small sample problem. We took 
exponential distribution as example to show the step of simulation. The cumulative distribution function of Owas:
0
1
( ) ,
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We used ir to represent the random variable that arbitrary given in uniform distribution of the interval (0,1). 
According to ii rF  )(O , one sample values can be got. So the step of Monte Carlo simulation based on Bayesian 
estimation was as follow. 
(1) The simulation times began when 1 i . The random number ir was sampled in the interval (0,1). 
(2) Solved the equation ii rF  )(O , the sample values iO was get. 
(3) Repeating the step (1) and (2), the simulation can be stopped at the appointed simulation times N. 
(4) Sorting the sample values as 1 2 NO O Od d  d . When the confidence degree was1 J , the UO (upper limit 
of failure rate) was the integral part of (1 )NJ . So the root nodes probability can be calculated by equation (10). 
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5. A case study 
The main function of reactor protection system was protect three major security barriers which were fuel 
cladding, a loop pressure boundary, containment. When the operating parameters exceed the threshold value of three 
major security barriers, the reactor protection system triggered reactor scram and started the security equipments. 
According to the Fault Tree based on FMEA/FTA, the BN model of reactor protection system in Daya Bay 
nuclear power plant was constructed. 
Figure1  The BN model of reactor protection system in Daya Bay nuclear power plant 
The root probability was listed in table1[13].
Table 1  Probability of root nodes 
Root nodes Probability Root nodes Probability 
RCP005MP Demand Failure 6.13E-03 RCP013MP Threshold value Relay Failure 1.00E-04 
RCP005MPThreshold value Relay Failure 1.00E-04 Threshold value Relay Setting value Error 1.50E-04 
RCP006MP Demand Failure 6.13E-03 RPA300JA Fail Open 3.20E-04 
RCP006MP Threshold value Relay Failure 1.00E-04 RPB300JA Fail Open 3.20E-04 
RCP013MP Demand Failure 6.13E-03 At least three control rods jamming 1.00E-04 
The probability of Reactor Scram Failure was 1.521×10-3, and the result was the same as calculated in 
literature[13]. According to BN sensitivity analysis, it was shown that RCP Failure was the major reason to cause 
the top event happen, and human error of Threshold value Relay Setting value Error was another major reason. So 
the two reasons should be attached importance to safety management. 
BN method expanded the traditional safety methods in following way. 
(1) Expand two states to multi state. FTA only deals with two state system, normal and fault. But most complex 
systems and their component had multi state practical when the systems or components were polymorphic, it simply 
need modify the corresponding node property in BN model. 
(2) Dependence failure. One assumption of the fault tree was events were independent. For most of the complex 
systems, this assumption was not established. FMEA and FTA was hard deal with dependence failure. When the 
failure correlation, it also just need modify the node’s conditional probability[11].
(3) Uncertainty. FMEA and FTA can’t deal with uncertainty, but BN only need to modify the conditional 
probability of the corresponding node. 
(4) Bidirectional inference. FMEA and FTA were one-way analysis method. FMEA/FTA is really not a 
bidirectional analysis. The BN’ basic theoretical derived from the Bayesian formula, and can easily make causal 
inference and diagnostic inference. BN’ bidirectional inference not only can quickly get the probability of the 
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occurrence of every node, but also can be used to find system’s weaknesses, to provide a reliable evidence for the 
complex system safety analysis. 
6. Conclusion 
According to the problems of safety analysis in nuclear power systems, this paper proposed the BN method for 
nuclear power system. The BN model was constructed by the integration of FMEA and FTA (FMEA/FTA). This 
method can conveniently use bidirectional inference and sensitivity analysis to find the weakness of nuclear power 
system. To address the BN model multi-distribution and lacking data problem, this paper applied Bayes estimation 
and Monte Carlo simulation to assess probabilities of root nodes. The case study had shown the accuracy of the 
method. The BN method not only solved the shortcoming of traditional methods, but also had more advantages in 
safety analysis of complex nuclear power system. Using BN to model the dynamic system is the next important 
content in our research. 
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